Impacts of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP)

Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive
Ercan Ayboga
Diyarbakir/Turkey

Report about
the impacts of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP)
and the Ilisu Dam
on the downstream countries Iraq and Syria

25 August 2009

Content of the report:

  1. Introduction and Summary

  2. The Tigris and Euphrates Basins

  3. Dam Constructions and Conflict on the Tigris and Euphrates before the GAP

  4. The GAP – Southeastern Anatolia Project

  5. Dam Constructions and Conflict on the Tigris and Euphrates together with GAP

  6. Concerns over GAP
  7. The Ilisu Dam Case
  8. Turkey’s International Law Obligations

  9. Iraq-Turkey Agreements

  10. Recent withdrawel of European Funding from the Ilisu Dam Project and possible future developments

  11. Conclusion

Attachment:

“Report on a trip to Iraq about the impacts of the Ilisu Dam on Iraq”, by Ipek Tasli from the Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf, 18th August 2009.

Note: An important part of information in the chapters 3 till 9 in this report bases on the two following reports:

  1. Ilisu Dam - Downstream Water Impacts and Iraq, Report of Fact Finding Mission to Iraq, 29 March 2007; by The Corner House and Kurdish Human Rights Project and
  2. International Obligations to Consult – Fact Finding Mission to Syria/Irak, February 2002; by The Corner House and Kurdish Human Rights Project

+++

  1. Introduction and Summary

    Since the '80s the Turkish state endeavours to implement the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) which consists of large 22 dams on the Euhprates and Tigris Rivers in nine Kurdish provinces. The official main two purposes are the energy production (27000 Gwh/year) and the regional development through irrigated (1,8 Mio ha. land) agroindustrial production for export.

    Currently the planned Ilisu Dam, which is the key part of GAP in the Tigris basin, is of special interest. Because of its expected huge negative social, cultural, ecological and political impacts and an approved and recently cancelled export credit guarantee by the three european governments of Germany, Austria and Switzerland, it is one of the most discussed dam projects worldwide. The dam has the main purpose of energy production. If built the dam will affect around 78.000 people and the 12.000 years old city Hasankeyf, which symbolizes the rich culture of Upper Mesopotamia, will be flooded. All already constructed GAP dams have not contributed to the regional economic and social development of the region. The same will happen with Ilisu due to a problematic agriculture and energy policy.

    Despite the economic aspects, there are two aspects why Turkey insists so much in the Ilisu project. The first less discussed concern is that Turkey aims to use the Ilisu dam against the Kurdish population and its struggle for more rights. This results from the fact that the Kurdish question is still unsolved and the state consider everything regarding the Kurds with suspect.

    Second, Ilisu dams’ regulating capacity of the Tigris river water flow to Iraq enables Turkey to use the water as a political weapon. In connection with that Turkey gets the opportunity to sell in long-term water to southern water stressed countries if there the water scarcity increases due to factors like growing population, increasing life standard, developing industry and agriculture and missmanagement of water resources. This second aspect is of interest of this report.

    Mountains within the Turkish Republic are crucial for Middle East, as through the Euphrates and Tigris River flow, they provide main irrigation and drinking water supply to Syria and Iraq for thousands of years. Therefore the fully implementation of GAP would mean deep impacts for these two downstream countries on the water quality and quantity, accrediting the concerns Turkeys’ strategy to establish an hegemony in the Middle East on its water resources.

    In particular, two components of the “hydrohegemony” in a close connection among each other can be identified as follows: First, the water storage capacity of the existing and planned dams is enough to cease in any moment the flowing water to Syria and Iraq. This would be a breach of international customary law regardless of whether there were formal legal agreements between Turkey and the other countries. The most relvant customary law for the GAP case is the UN Convention on Non-navigational use of Transboundary Watercourses (1997) which Turkey does not want to sign. No open threat is necessary, as the potential for doing that is sufficient to affect the relations between the states in the political fragile Middle East. Turkey already used successfully the existing dams on the Euphrates River against Iraq and particularly Syria in the past.

  1. The Tigris and Euphrates Basins

    The Euphrates River originates in the mountains of East Turkey, where two tributaries rise before merging near Keban/Elazig to form the Euphrates River itself. After Keban, the river flows south, crossing into Syria at Jarablus. Within Syria, it is joined by the Sajur and Balikh rivers before entering Iraq at Al’Qa’em. It finally joins the Tigris in the south of Iraq to form the Shatt Al-Arab River, which drains into the Persian Gulf near Al-Faw.

    The length of the Euphrates is around at 2,940 kilometres (km), with 40% in Turkey, 20.5% in Syria and 39.5% in Iraq. Although more than two thirds of the drainage area lies outside Turkey, 92% of the water in the river originates in Turkey. The drainage area of the Euphrates is widely accepted as 444,000 square kilometres (km2). The share of each state in the basin is like this: Turkish share at 28%, with Syria at 17%, Iraq 40% and Saudi Arabia 15%. The annual mean flow rate of the Euphrate at the Turkish-Syrian border is around 32 billion m3.

    Like the Euphrates, the Tigris (1,840 km) also flows through Turkey, Syria and Iraq. In the Turkish Republic, the Tigris flows through the southeast for about 400 km where the main tributories Batman, Garzan and Botan join it, then forms the border with Syria for 40 km, and flows downstream to Iraq. In Iraq the Tigris is fed by the Great Zab, the Little Zab, the ‛Adhaim, and the Diyala rivers. Iraq’s share of the basin is at 45%, Turkey’s share at 25%, Syria’s at 2% and Iran’s share at 28%. The river’s flow is characterized by a high annual and seasonal variability. The annual mean flow is 520 m3/s at the border between Turkey and Syria (17 billion m3). The lowest flow was 9.6 billion m3 in 1973, and the highest was 34.3 billion m3 in 1969. Mean flow in April is 1433 m3/s, while the driest month is September with 113 m3/s. Downstream, at Baghdad, the average flow is 1236 m3/s. [1] Although Turkey shares only around 25% of the basin area, together with the Great Zap River, which originates in the province Hakkari within the Turkish borders, 55% of whole Tigris mean annual flow comes from Turkey.

  1. Dam Constructions and Conflict on the Tigris and Euphrates before the GAP

    In the case of the Tigris and Euphrates basins, the role that dams have played in exacerbating conflict between the major riparian States - Turkey, Syria and Iraq - is clear. All three countries rely on the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris for their agriculture, energy and future development. Unsurprisingly, the development of engineering projects on the two rivers, notably large dams and irrigation works, has been a source of growing tension between the riparian states. Although outright violence has been avoided, hostilities have mounted each time that a new dam has been built or proposed. On at least three occasions, water related hostilities have brought the various parties to the brink of war, with troops being mobilised and threats made to bomb existing dams.

    Iraq, the last downstream state on the rivers, was the first to develop dams on the Euphrates, constructing the Hindiya Dam on the Euphrates in 1914 and a second Dam at ar-Ramadi in the 1950s. [2] Although both Turkey and Syria began feasibility studies for developing the two rivers in the mid-1950s, [3] neither country undertook construction of any major works until 1966 when Syria started the Tabqa High Dam, later renamed al-Thawrah (“The Revolution”), on the Euphrates and Turkey began construction of the Keban Dam, also on the Euphrates.

    Both dams triggered major international disputes. The start of construction on the Keban Dam prompted protests from Syria to Turkey, whilst the completion of the Tabqua Dam led Iraq to threaten military action in 1974 and again in 1975, [4] with both Syria and Iraq mobilising their troops and moving them to the border. [5] Mediation by the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia diffused the crisis after Syria agreed to release more water from the dam. Subsequently an agreement was reached between Syria and Iraq whereby Iraq receives 58% of the Euphrates water crossing the Syrian Turkey border. The agreement has greatly eased tension between the two countries, leading to what Syrian government sources describe as “an era of cooperation between the two countries over water”.

  1. The GAP – Southeastern Anatolia Project

    Relations between Syria and Iraq on the one hand, and Turkey on the other, have however remained tense, with both Syria and Iraq expressing grave concerns over Turkey's ambitious Southeast Anatolia Project, known as GAP, after its Turkish name “Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi”. Under the GAP, the Turkish government plans to develop a cluster of 14 dams on the Euphrates basin and 8 on the Tigris.

    Launched in 1977 [6] and covering nine mainly Kurdish populated provinces [7] with a total area of 74,000 square kilometres, the $32 billion project is the largest development project ever undertaken in Turkey, and one of the largest of its kind in the world. Together with other planned projects, a total of at least 90 dams and 60 power plants [8] will have been built on the two river basins, regulating 28 per cent of Turkey’s total water potential. In addition to generating 27 billion kilowatt hours (7467 MW capacity) of electricity, [9] the dams would be used to irrigate 1.82 million hectares of land in order to grow cash crops and encourage the growth of agro-industries, such as food processing for export. [10]

    The newly irrigated land would increase the area in Turkey under irrigation by 40 per cent. Around the Ataturk dam, the region has been transformed into one of the most important centres of cotton production in Turkey. Overall, it is claimed that the GAP will generate 3.8 million jobs and raise per capita income in the region by 209 per cent. [11]

    Numerous government departments are involved in the implementation of GAP, under the aegis of the Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration (GAPRDA).

    To date, Turkey has invested some $20 billion [12] from its own domestic resources in GAP, with international institutions and the private sector investing a further $3.5 billion. Of the planned water projects, 14 dams and 9 hydroelectric power plants have already been built - including the giant Ataturk, Karakaya, Keban, Birecik, Karkamis, Batman and Kralkizi dams. 74 percent of the planned hydroelectric plants are running, generating 51 percent of whole Turkey’s hydroenergy and approximately 15 per cent of Turkey’s total electricity production. As of 2009, 15 per cent of the total planned irrigation target had been achieved, with 8 to 10 per cent under construction.

    Although originally conceived solely as a water development project, the GAP has now been expanded to include other infrastructure programmes, including the building of industrial areas, schools, health care centres, roads, housing and tourism centres. According to the GAP authorities, the integration of these projects into the GAP programme reflects Turkey's commitment to “sustainable human development that is in conformity with the Rio principles”. [13]

    In reality, however, the GAP typifies “top down” development. There has been little or no consultation with affected communities and the projects are implemented without any local participation. Hundreds of thousand people have now been displaced, often forcibly and rarely with adequate compensation. Many have ended up in the shantytowns of the major cities, unable to find full-time employment and living in poverty.

    The GAP has also caused major environmental degradation. Salinisation of irrigated land and soil erosion are now serious problems. Salinisation and high groundwater table occure already in 55% of the irrigated land in the plain of Harran (province Urfa), the main irrigation area. The created dam reservoirs have destroyed rich habitat for numerous plants and animals and they have big problems with the water quality which is a threat to flora and fauna species and also to the health of the population. Today 95% of diseases can be determined in the region around the dam reservoirs on the Euphrates River.

    Further the dam reservoirs have flooded in that area, which is also known as Upper Mesopotamia, very important cultural heritage – thousands of archeological sites – along the rivers which have a history of up to 12.000 years. The most known of the submerged archeological sites are Samsat, Nevala Çori, Zeugma/Belkis, Hallan Çemi.

    Concern has also been expressed over the political motivations underlying GAP. There is little doubt that the majority of GAP officials and field workers are deeply committed to the programme’s overt aims of poverty alleviation and economic development, or that the majority of people in the region, which is one of the poorest in Turkey, seek means to improve their living standards and to gain access to modern technologies, health care and education. Yet the project has from its inception been underpinned by the Turkish State’s longpursued policy of assimilating the region’s Kurdish majority into mainstream Turkish society and culture. Indeed, the Turkish government’s official publicity for the project explicitly states that the GAP is intended to “dramatically change the social and cultural make-up of the region.” So, it is widely held in many quarters that the Turkish authorities have promoted the GAP project as a means of altering the demography of the region, through the displacement of Kurds into larger towns so as to exercise more effective control over the region.

  1. Dam Constructions and Conflict on the Tigris and Euphrates together with GAP

    Since the '80s Turkey and Iraq have started to implement ambitious water development schemes on both the Tigris and the Euphrates, transforming the river and the lives of people who depend on it. Iraq completed the large multi-purpose Mossul Dam with a reservoir capacity of 10 billion m3 in the late 1980s, and has started to construct the other big Samara dam on the Tigris with a similar storage capacity. The Mosul Dam, combined with massive drainage works constructed after the Gulf War, has resulted in the transformation of the lower Tigris River and the destruction of main parts of the unique Mesopotamian Marshland ecosystem which has been followed by forced displacement of the indigenous Marsh Arabs. Meanwhile an important part of the destructed Marshlands could be restored after 2003.

    Turkey's aggressive water politics were illustrated dramatically in 1990, when Turkey blocked the flow of the Euphrates for 9 days whilst filling the reservoir of the Atatűrk Dam, the biggest dam on the Euphrates. Both Syria and Iraq accused Turkey of failing to inform them of the cut-off, prompting Iraq to threaten to bomb all the Euphrates dams. [14] Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs rebutted such claims, arguing that its co-riparians had

    “been informed in a timely way that river flow would be interrupted for a period of one month, due to technical necessity” [15],

    and that, prior to impoundment, more water than usual was released downstream, in order to allow Syria and Iraq to store sufficient waters to carry them through the impoundment period. Turkey also argued that the average flow downstream never fell below 500 million cubic metres per second (m3/s) - the minimum agreed under a 1987 Protocol signed between Turkey and Syria. [16] This is disputed by both Syria and Iraq, which point out that the decision to release “extra” water downstream prior to impoundment was taken unilaterally by Turkey and without sufficient notice. Syria also notes that whilst the average monthly discharge at Jarablus on the Turkish-Syrian border for the year 1989-90 may not have fallen below far the agreed 500 m3/s, the monthly discharge in January and February 1990 was far lower – 321 m3/sec and 320 m3/sec respectively.

    Further protests by Syria and Iraq were lodged with Turkey in 1993, prior to the construction of the Birecik Dam on the Euphrates. [17] The same year, with many GAP dams at a low level due to drought, Turkey

    “chose to turn off the tap during the Muslim Feast of the Sacrifice in June, reducing the flow from 500 cubic metres per second to 170” [18]

    in contravention of its agreement under the 1987 Protocol with Syria.

    In Fall 1998 Turkey threatened Syria with war if Syria will not banish Abdulla Öcalan, the leader of PKK. Besides the threat with war Turkey blackmailed Syria with the cutting of Euphrates water. At the same time was a NATO military manoeuvre which was also an indirect signal to Syria. In the end Syria stepped back and Öcalan left Syria which ended up in its kidnapping to Turkey in February 1999.

    In 2001 Turkey announced unilaterally that it was going to reduce the flow of the Euphrates to Syria to one third of the previously agreed amount because of severe drought in the region.

  1. Concerns over GAP

    Turkey argues that the GAP is key to its future economic development. Although both Syria and Iraq are at pains to point out that they respect Turkey's right to develop, both countries fear that the GAP will result in serious downstream impacts, including dramatically reduced flow and increased levels of pollution. Both countries also fear that Turkey is using the GAP to establish control over the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates as part of a wider policy of establishing regional hegemony.

    Reducing the Flow

    Much of the water stored in GAP dams is intended for irrigation. All GAP dam reservoirs are planned to irrigate a total of almost 1.82 million hectares of land. On the basis of the figures published by the GAP authorities, Iraq calculates that the Tigris irrigation projects will reduce the flow of the Tigris as it passes the border into Syria at Cizre by 46% [19] - considering that there is an annual mean flow rate of 17 Bm3.

    Such a big shortage in the Tigris River resources will have grave repercussions for Iraq. The majority of Iraq's population depends on the Tigris to meet their drinking water needs, agricultural requirements and others. Agriculture has been practiced for thousands of years along the said river and technical studies have shown that a decrease of 1 Bm3 in the river's resources will result in the non-use of arable lands estimated at 62,500 hectares (ha). The non-use of such areas will have severe consequences for the entire agricultural production and the water supply for existing farms, as well as other social and economic repercussions on farmers deprived of agricultural requirements, let alone the problem of desertification which will be exacerbated as a result of the above mentioned reduction of arable lands. Here is to mention that especially the Marshlands in the South of Iraq are under threat. In the Marshlands, which have been restored partially after 2003, live between 4 and 5 Million people who produces 40% of all Iraqi food. The predicted reduce would threaten many hundred thousands of people and an important part of the Iraqi food production. [20]

    Iraq also predicts that the reduced flow “will be reflected badly on power generation” from the Mossul and Samara dams. As for two years the Mossul Dam’s water level is decreased significantly because of structural and security reasons the loss wouold be less than as it would be fully impounded. Nevertheless such an potential power reduction may be important. Syria, which has a similar dependency on the downstream flow of the Euphrates, forecasts similar problems arising from reduced flow of that river.

    Before the construction of the Keban Dam in 1966, Turkey used just 3% of the waters of the Euphrates for irrigation. [21] If GAP is completed, the total irrigated area for the Euphrates basin in Turkey will require 9 to 16.9 Bm3 of water a year. Syrian officials estimate that the downstream flow of the Euphrates as it crosses the Syrian border will be reduced by 30%-60%. [22] In effect,

    “Turkey is planning to use completely half of the Euphrates yield, leaving Syria and Iraq the other half. Moreover, 11% of this half will be of lower quality water since it is return irrigation water from Turkey.” [23]

    The argumentation of Syria and Iraq against the large irrigation projects on the Turkish side is that they have used the Euphrates and Tigris water for thousands of years. The southern border of Turkey is more or less the border from where downstream agriculture is only possible with irrigation. The precipitation in the parts along the Euphrates and Tigris in Syria and Iraq is not enough for agriculture. So the Syria and Iraq emphasize that they have a natural and historical based right on the water of Euphrates and Tigris.

    Decreased Water Quality

    The quality of the water release from Turkey to Syria and Iraq will be significantly of less quality than before entering the dam reservoirs within Turkey. This is caused by inscreasing waste water from urban areas and by inscreasinf water use for irrigation.

    The original planning for the GAP project appears to have paid little attention to the problem of return flows from irrigation schemes. Both Syria and Iraq fear that the result will be increased levels of salinity in the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates, a problem which will be compounded by pesticide and fertiliser run-off and by increased sewage discharges from the new urban centres that GAP is seeking to stimulate.

    Already before reaching Syria and Iraq the water quality in the most large dam reservoirs of GAP will be decreased enormously. So in Syria and Iraq the use of contaminated water in irrigation results in the transmission of contaminants to the irrigated plants and consequently to humans, as well as increasing soil salinity, reducing productivity and converting areas of agricultural land into barren land. The deterioration of water quality definitely reduces the uses to which the water can be put, even if it does not render the water completely unusable for human or agricultural consumption. This can create a shortage in water supply, converting the quality problem into a quantity problem. [24]

    Estimates vary, but one independent study has predicted that insecticide levels in the Syrian portion of the Euphrates and its tributaries could increase by 35%. [25] Technical studies conducted by Iraq have also forecast a doubling of salinity levels in the Tigris as a result of upstream irrigation in Turkey. [26]

    Iraq also believes that existing dam projects on the Tigris and Euphrates will affect about 1.3 million hectares of agricultural land - some 40 per cent of the agricultural land available - as a result of declining water quality.

    Turkey's Regional Ambitions: Controlling the Water

    There are also fears that the dams that Turkey has built - and intends to build - will enable Turkey to exercise control over its downstream neighbours. Such fears for an hydrohegemony by Turkey are not without foundation. The potential to hold water back, which the GAP - even uncompleted - gives Turkey over its downstream neighbours, is huge. Turkey's three major dams on the Euphrates - Keban, Karakaya and Ataturk - have a storage capacity (some 90-100 billion cubic metres of water), which greatly meets almost the three time of annual flow of the Euphrates. If all dams in the Tigris Basin are built, Turkey will have a storage capacity of 22 bm3 which is more than the annual mean flow of 17 bm3. Should Turkey decide to cut off downstream flow completely, especially in the irrigation period, it would therefore have the means to do so for a considerable period of time.

    Noting the strategic importance of Turkey’s abundant water resources, a 1998 report by the UK Defence Forum warned that the GAP project as a whole is:

    “…one of the region’s most dangerous water time bombs. The dispute has not erupted yet because the project has not yet reached its full potential. By the time of its planned completion in 2010, the vital interests involved give it the potential to become one of the region’s most dangerous flashpoints.” [27]

    Over the years, Turkey has made a number of statements that leave little room for doubting its “first come, first served” approach to the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates. The former Turkish president Suleyman Demirel once said in 1992:

    “The water resources are Turkey's; the oil resources are theirs. We don't say we share their oil resources, and they cannot share our water resources.”

    In the last ten years Turkey's tone has softened somewhat from outright belligerence to studied imprecision. Nonetheless, despite the talk of collaboration over the use of the Tigris and Euphrates, the language is still uncompromising. Inevitably, questions have been raised as to why Turkey should have built in such huge surplus storage capacity.

    The main problem in this context is that Turkey does not sign international accepted conventions on international water courses and does not want to have a mutual agreement with Syria and Iraq on water sharing. For example Turkey has not signed the UN Convention on Non-navigational use of Transboundary Watercourses (1997). Because Turkey is not bound legally to any agreement nobody can accuse it in case of holding back flowing water. But the disrupting of flowing water to Syria and Iraq would be a breach of international customary law regardless of whether there were formal legal agreements between Turkey and the other countries.

    Even if an agreement is reached on water sharing, assurances that downstream flow rates will be maintained will ultimately depend on Turkey's political ambitions in the region. Turkey's membership of NATO, its close relations with the USA and the negotations for a membership of the EU all place it in a strong bargaining position vis-a-vis its downstream neighbours, particularly Iraq, which is after the US occupation in a very weak position.

    Indeed, officials in both Iraq and Syria expressed the view that Turkey had taken advantage of the sanctions against Iraq till 2003 and of a weak iraqi government in the following years to push ahead with its GAP projects on the Tigris, on the assumption that opposition from Iraq (the major downstream co-riparian, since the Tigris only flows through Syria for 40 kilometres) would be either ignored or muted.

    Even if today the relations between Iraq and Turkey are good – they have improved in the last some years – allowing a state in times of peace to wield this powerful tool will have always a negative impact on the relations between these two neighbouring countries. No open threat is necessary, as the potential for doing that is sufficient to affect the relations between the states in the political fragile Middle East. Who can assure by which parties or circles Iraq or Syria will be governed in five years?

    Water as a commodity

    Beside the regulating capacity of the dams and their use as a weapon against the two downstream countries, Turkey regards water as a commodity in the Middle East context. The expectation that soon different factors like growing population, increasing life standard, developing industry and agriculture and missmanagement of water resources will enhance the need for water in countries like Jordan, Israel, Palestine and Saudi Arabia, would allow to sell water via pipelines.

    If all dam reservoirs are completed Turkey will have a huge storage capacity which would allow to sell water in a big scale without any problem. As mentioned above, the total storage capacity of all dams in the Euphrates and Tigris Basin is at least 120 bm3. The selling of water has been realized in the past; Turkey sold water to Israel from the Antalya region for around two years via ships. Because of different technical and financial it has been stopped.

    After the completion of the Ataturk Dam the Turkish president Özal proposed carefully to some Middle East countries to build a water pipeline from the Euphrates to Jordan, Israel and Palestine. But Syria had no any interest and the water scarcity was not yet so extremely big, thats why this idea has not been followed any more in the following years. But slowly its becoming more interesting again.

  1. The Ilisu Dam Case

    Whereas the hydropower and irrigation potential of the Euphrates has to a large extent been fully exploited, the Tigris river and its tributaries are largely undeveloped, and the dams that have been built are smaller and fewer than those on the Euphrates. The planned Ilisu Dam and Hydroelectric Power Plant is the centrepiece of the GAP development plan for the Tigris River Basin. It will cost an estimated 2 billion Euros. [28]

    Due to its expected huge negative social, cultural, ecological and political impacts, it is one of the most discussed dam projects worldwide. Since the end of 90ies years there are protests by affected people and dozens of national and international non-governmental organizations. The dam is planned on the Tigris River and has the main official purpose of energy production with a capacity of 1200 MW. If built the social and human rights of up to 78.000 people – of which are 2000 ethnic Arabs and the others mainly ethnic Kurds – will be violated evidently. Beside this unjustifiable issue, in the center of struggle against the dam is the will to save from flooding the 12.000 year old settlement site of Hasankeyf where the oldest human settlements of the human history are located and therefore symbolizes the rich culture of Upper Mesopotamia. Instead of developing this cultural heritage, which could bring more economic benefit at local scale without any loss, or other options, the Turkish government insists in their criticized water policy of intensive dam building.

    However, as a result of international protest, the project has failed to find two times export credit guarantee by european governments of Germany, Austria and Switzerland, in 2002 and recently in July 2009. Ilisu is planned to operate in conjunction with the Cizre Dam, to be constructed 45 km downstream. Cizre will act as a re-regulating reservoir to even out the highly variable peaking power releases and provide for diversion of water to irrigate 121,000 ha land. Currently, also as part of GAP, there are fourteen water projects in operation or under construction in the Tigris Basin, of which twelve are upstream of Ilisu. These upstream projects cover around 300,000 ha of irrigation land, which will result in significant reductions in the river flow before reaching Ilisu. All the irrigation projects upstream and downstream of Ilisu cover a total of approximately 421,000 ha.

    Fears have been expressed that Ilisu – in conjunction with other dams in the Tigris Basin – could severely disrupt the downstream flow of the Tigris to Syria and Iraq, affecting communities reliant on seasonal agriculture; undermining Iraq’s efforts to restore its southern marshes; and heightening political tensions between Turkey and its neighbours in what is already a volatile region.

    It is known from the political developments after 2003 that towards Iraq Turkey’s main concern is the strong role of the Kurds which could increase more if the oil city Kerkuk belongs to their autonomy region. Turkey tries to hinder this but has no means to have big political pressure. That’s one of the reasons why many circles in Turkey demand the urgent construction of the Ilisu dam on the Tigris River which is still flowing mainly free.

    In 1999 and 2000, the two downstream states protested that they had not been consulted on the proposed construction of the Ilisu Dam on the Tigris, in contravention of international law and bilateral agreements. [29] The Turkish authorities denied the charge, arguing that it had informed Syria and Iraq of its plans with regard to every GAP project. Due to the stop of the Ilisu project in 2002 the tensions on the Tigris River decreased and the Ilisu project became a little forgotten.

    Approval of Export Credit Guarantee

    When in 2005 – after the stop of the Ilisu project in 2002 – it became public that Turkey aims again to build the Ilisu dam, Iraq informed Turkey and the three financing countries Germany, Austria and Switzerland about its concerns in end of 2006 and beginning of 2007. In a letter dated on the 17th October 2006 to three european countries Iraq’s Water Resources Minister Latif J. Rashid said: „Turkey has not so far discussed their future plan for constructing dams on the Tigris. The technical discussions which we have had, has not been related to the construction of dams on the rivers, and we have not been informed on their future plans and operational procedures.*“ So there has been no substantial progress from Turkey on the Ilisu dam case.

    On 22nd March 2007, during a water conference in Antalya/Turkey a meeting took place between the ministers from Turkey, Iraq and Syria. According to articles in the Kurdish and Turkish media, Iraq agreed at the meeting to Ilisu going ahead. [30] Four days later, the Swiss, German and Austrian governments announced that its 30 pre-financing conditions had been met and that they would fund Ilisu. On downstream flows, the German Export Credit Agency (ECA) Hermes announced:

    “Iraq and Syria have been comprehensively informed and consulted by Turkey about the dam project.” [31]

    Questioned by the non-governmental organization WEED as to the grounds for this assurance, an official from Germany’s Economics Ministry specifically referenced the meeting in Turkey:

    “Consultations between Turkey, Syria and Iraq have taken place on March 22nd 2007 to the declared satisfaction of Iraq and Syria.” [32]

    Iraq, however, has denied that any agreement had been reached with Turkey. In an email sent the day after the ECAs’ decision to Kurdish Human Rights Project, the Iraq Minister of Water, HE Dr. Latif Rashid, stated:

    “We would like to notify you that those reports are completely incorrect. We have not made any interministerial talks with the Turkish and Syrian governments.” [33]

    Nonetheless, between 24th and 28th March 2007, the ECAs of the three European governments approved finance for the project, subject to Turkey meeting 150 obligations and conditions within the repayment period of 15-plus years. The conditions – which cover environmental impacts, resettlement, cultural heritage and downstream impacts – are intended to

    “guarantee that the planned project ... will conform to international standards.” [34]

    Of the 150 conditions (also called shortly TOR), the ECAs required 30 to be met prior to approval of funding. Two of these required Turkey to supply information on the Ilisu Dam to Iraq and Syria; others relate to Turkey agreeing to maintain a minimum flow immediately downstream from Ilisu (but with no requirement to ensure such a flow beyond the Turkish border). But the facts of the implementation and approach were that:

    • Turkey did not provide Iraq with the information it requested on Ilisu prior to approval of financing by the ECAs, despite this being a pre-condition of ECA funding.
    • Key conditions on guaranteeing downstream flows to the lower reaches of the Tigris were dropped by the ECAs of Germany, Austria and Switzerland prior to their approving funding of the Ilisu Dam and were replaced by weaker conditions that do not protect Iraq’s and Syria’s rights.
    • The conditions set by the ECAs failed to reflect the requirements of international law, which obliges Turkey not merely to provide information on Ilisu to Iraq and Syria but also to consult and negotiate with them.
    • By stipulating a downstream flow rate of 60 m3/sec that has already been unilaterally decided by Turkey, the ECAs have effectively undermined the rights of Iraq and Syria to negotiate a higher – but more “equitable and reasonable” – flow rate.
    • Turkey’s obligations under international customary law and its bilateral agreements with Iraq have not been met.

    Argumentation of project developers

    The project developers – Turkish State Water Works (DSI) and Ilisu consortium – argue that fears over Ilisu’s downstream impacts have been overplayed. They contend that

    • Ilisu is designed for power, not irrigation, and that hydro-electric uses do not impair downstream flows;
    • Unlike the Euphrates, significant tributaries join the Tigris downstream of the Ilisu site; and
    • The proposed operational regime will ensure a satisfactory level of discharge in all seasons.

    However, the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for the project did not examine downstream impacts beyond the Turkish border. Moreover, no comprehensive analysis has been undertaken by the project developers of the cumulative impacts of both Ilisu and its companion downstream dam at Cizre. The two projects are independent but have been wrongly represented as separate and unconnected. Because Cizre is an irrigation dam, water fed to it by Ilisu will be largely lost to downstream flow. Although representatives of the German Government have stated that “there will be no Cizre dam” – despite statements to the contrary in the EIA for Ilisu – the Turkish Government has made no such announcement and the Cizre project continues to be listed on GAP’s website. [35] Indeed, it is unlikely that Turkey has given a binding commitment not to build the Cizre dam in the future. Nor is there any indication that Ilisu’s EIA has been updated in order to assess downstream impacts at the border to Syria and Iraq without the Cizre dam regulating daily and seasonal outflows from Ilisu.

    One of the three main tributories of the Tigris south of the Iraqi-Turkish border is the Greater Zap River which originates within Turkey and join the Tigris in Iraq. The most water comes from the Turkish state region and Turkey plans to build three large dams on the Greater Zap River.

    Independant Assessments

    An independent assessment of the combined downstream impacts of Ilisu and Cizre, undertaken in 2006 by the US hydrologists Philip Williams and Associates, concludes:

    “The operation of the Ilisu Dam in combination with diversions from the future downstream Cizre project would probably significantly reduce summer flows in Syria and Iraq below historic levels. It is likely that a significant portion of the recommended minimum flow release from Ilisu of 60 m3/s during dry years would be diverted. It is even possible that with full implementation of the Ilisu/Cizre projects, during drought periods, all the summer flows could be diverted before it crossed the border.” [36]

    Philip Williams and Associates also point out:

    “It is likely that the reduction and alteration in flows caused by implementation of the Ilisu/Cizre project will have substantial adverse water supply, flood hazard, water quality, erosion and ecologic impacts in Syria and Iraq ... These impacts have not been considered in formulating the project, designing the reservoir operation or in establishing downstream flows. No mitigation actions are required [in the TOR’s] in the event that the ‘opinion’ requested ... confirms these predictions of adverse impacts. Nor is there a commitment to alter the reservoir operation plan developed in the 1980s to reflect new information that establishes downstream water needs.” [37]

    There is thus the very real possibility that Ilisu, in conjunction with the planned Cizre irrigation projects, could have severe detrimental impacts on Iraq. Moreover, such impacts may go beyond the effects identified by Philip Williams and Associates: the Ilisu Dam would reduce the Spring flood, for example, which would have severe impacts on those practising floodplain agriculture downstream and on the restoration of Iraq’s southern marshes.

    After the approval of the export credit guarantee in March 2007, because of the TORs Turkey organized at least four technical meetings with Syria and Iraq on the water issue. In these meetings Turkey informed limitedly Iraq and Syria on the Ilisu project, but there were no informations about other future plannings despite of the GAP dams (Turkey plan dams on all river parts in the Tigris basin. All these dams will have a bigger storage capacity than Ilisu). In one meeting in 2008, which was in Turkey, the Turkish government refused to speak about Ilisu. However, the Iraqi government was not content with these meetings. [38] The same approach was shown by Turkey in the meeting among the three states in February 2009. [39]

  1. Turkey’s International Law Obligations

    Turkey has not signed the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (it was one of three states to vote against the Convention). This does not mean, however, that Turkey is not bound by the principles set out in the Convention, which reflect a general obligation on all states under customary international law, regardless of whether or not they are signatories or parties to the Convention, even if the particular details and timetables set out in the Convention may not apply.

    This is confirmed in a legal opinion prepared for WEED [40], which has been monitoring Germany’s involvement in the project, by international law specialists Professors Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, James Crawford, Kate Cook and Philippe Sands:

    “[The Convention’s] principles reflect general obligations on all states under customary international law. Of particular importance are: Article 5(1), which provides that ‘watercourse states shall in their respective territories utilise an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner’ (emphasis added); Article 7(1), which provides ‘watercourse states shall, in utilising an international watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse states’; Article 11, which provides ‘watercourse states shall exchange information and consult each other and, if necessary, negotiate on the possible effects of planned measures on the condition of an international watercourse’; and Article 12, which provides that ‘before a watercourse state implements or permits the implementation of planned measures which may have a significant adverse effect upon other watercourse states, it shall provide those states with timely notification thereof. Such notification shall be accompanied by available technical data and information, including the results of any environmental impact assessment, in order to enable to notified states to evaluate the possible effects of the planned measures’.” [41]

    The Opinion stressed the need for any financial institution that was considering support for the Ilisu Dam (including in the form of financial guarantees to those investing in the project) to satisfy itself that:

    “...Turkey has provided full information to Syria and Iraq in advance of a decision to proceed, and that Syria and Iraq have been provided with an opportunity to set forth their views and, as necessary, to participate in meaningful and good faith consultations. Such consultations should allow for an exchange of views in which no party has closed its mind as to the concerns of the other.”

    The Opinion also drew attention to the implications for the ECAs were they to fund a project that violated international law. Such funding, it stated, could be held to:

    “constitute aid or assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act, namely the violation of rights of notification, consultation and negotiation of a downstream riparian State.” [42]

  1. Iraq-Turkey Agreements

    In addition to the obligations on Turkey under international customary law, the Government of Iraq cites specific agreements that have been reached between Turkey and Iraq (or that pertain to both countries) that mandate information sharing and agreement on the shared use of the Tigris.

    1. The Lausanne Agreement concluded after the First World War between the Allied powers and Turkey in July 1923, article 109 of which addresses the issue of water resources shared by Turkey, Iraq and Syria:

      “Where no contrary provisions exist, an agreement shall be concluded between the states concerned with a view to safeguarding the acquired rights of each of them when the existing water system – opening of canals, floods, irrigation, drainage and similar facilities – depends on the works carried out on the territory of another state or when the water use is effected in the territory of a state and the sources of these water are situated in another state by reason of determining new borders. When such an agreement can not be reached, the problem shall be settled through arbitration.” [43]

    2. The 1946 Treaty of Friendship and Neighbourly Relations, Article 5 of the Protocol to which states:

      “The Government of Turkey agrees to inform Iraq of any projects relating to protection works it may decide to construct on either river or on its tributaries in order to render such works, as far as possible, serve the interest of Iraq as well as serve the interest of Turkey.” [44]

      The Corner House notes that such bilateral agreements form part of Turkish law, to which the ECAs are bound to adhere under the OECD’s “Recommendation on Common Approaches on Environment and Officially-Supported Export Credits”, which lays down agreed common standards on evaluating the environmental impacts of projects. The Agreement states at Article 12.2:

      “Projects should, in all cases, comply with the standards of the host country” [45]

  1. Recent withdrawel of European Funding from the Ilisu Dam Project and possible future developments

    On the 7th July 2009 the governments of Germany, Austria and Switzerland declared that they have cancelled the export credit guarantee for the Ilisu Dam and Hydroelectric Project. This means that the Ilisu dam can not build with the current finance model. The Turkish government informed the press immediately that they have the aim to build this dam in any case. It is unclear whether Turkey will find a new finance model or new international companies (for the construction of the Ilisu Dam international companies are necessary because of the know-how which Turkish companies do not have for such a large project) which could organize the finance. It will be difficult to build the Ilisu dam in these years because Turkey is in a big finance crisis (the economy decreased 14 % compared with last year), it is difficult that european/western companies will engage in this project because of public relations, the EU negotation process can open soon the water chapter which will make it more difficult to build Ilisu dam without an mutual agreement with Iraq and Syria, the campaigns in Turkey against the Ilisu project are raising etc. However the Ilisu dam will stay on the agenda and will be a continuous threat to Iraq if Turkey does not change its approach significantly.

    After this decision Turkey is not bounded any more to the 150 conditions (TOR’s) including the ones on the international/downstream aspects (information, operation, minimum flow rate etc.). But due to EU negotation process (which demands reforms and improvements also in the water field) and international interests Turkey could declare that they will build the dam according the conditions (TORs) agreed with the three European governments or the World Bank standards. Probably Turkey will continue with technical meetings with Iraq and Syria on the water issue, even they would not occur so regularly.

  1. Conclusion

    After the withdrawel of the governments of Germany, Austria and Switzerland from the Ilisu dam project, it is more than ever before necessary that Turkey agrees on a mutual basis with Iraq and Syria on the sharing of Euphrates and Tigris. Turkey has to stop the construction process till it finds a new finance and new companies to build the Ilisu Dam, at least for 2-3 years. This is time enough to build up strong campaigns in Turkey, Iraq, Syria and whole Middle East which demands from the riperian countries of Euphrates and Tigris to develop an mutual agreement. This agreement must take into consideration the historic water rights of the people in middle and south Mesopotamia, raisonable new irrigation development plans for Iraq and Syria, the right of people within Turkey to have more access to water (this must exclude a centralized irrigation mega project as GAP foresees it), a more technical effective irrgation (which safes water), the ecological basic needs for the river ecosystems and serves for the peace in the Middle East. To achieve this goal the pressure by the civil society and affected people on their governments is very crucial. In order to be successful support by the public opinion and press is also necessary. Only through this way a change in the approach can be achieved. Otherwise due to the “limited democratic character” of the states the conflicts on water will increase in the Middle East.

[1]Cited in Philip Williams and Associates (PWA): A Review of the Hydrological and Geomorphic Impacts of the Proposed Ilisu Dam, Report for the Corner House, San Francisco, July 2001.
[2]Allan, J.A.: The Middle East Water Question: Hydropolitics and the Global Economy, I.B.Taurus, London, 2000, p.72.
[3]Plans for the Ilisu Dam in Turkey, along with other dams which subsequently became part of the GAP project were first mooted in the 1950s. The same period saw Russian engineers conducting hydro development studies on the Syria reach of the Euphrates. See Allan, J.A.: The Middle East Water Question: Hydropolitics and the Global Economy, I.B.Taurus, London, 2000, p.72: Ilisu Dam Campaign and others, If the River were a Pen: The Ilisu Dam, The World Commission on Dams and Export Credit Reform, The Ilisu Dam Campaign, Oxford, 2001, p.9; Altinbilek, D.: “The Ilisu Dam Project” in Turkish Embassy, Water and Development in Southeastern Anatolia: Essays on the Ilisu Dam and GAP, London, 2000, p.31.
[4]Petrella, R.: The Water Manifesto: Arguments for a World Water Contract, Zed Books, London, 2001, p.45. The Tabqa High Dam was completed in 1973.
[5]Allan, J.A.: The Middle East Water Question: Hydropolitics and the Global Economy, I.B.Taurus, London, 2000, p.73.
[6]In 1977, the Turkish government's State Hydraulics Works department (DSI) drew together all its planned programmes for the Euphrates and Tigris basins under one package - subsequently named the GAP project. In 1989, the Turkish government established the Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration (GAPRDA) to oversee the GAP project and to ensure coordination between the agencies and institutions concerned. The GAP Higher Board is the most senior decision-making body of GAPRDA and is responsible for decisions pertaining to planning, design and work programmes. The Board is headed by the Minister of State in charge of GAP, the Minister of State responsible for the State Planning Organisation and the Minister for Public Works and Reconstruction.
[7]The nine provinces are: Gaziantep, Diyarbakir, Sanliurfa, Mardin, Adiyaman, Batman, Kilis, Sirnak and Siirt.
[8]Interview with Syrian officials. These figures include all the projects planned on tributaries of the Tigris and Euphrates. The more generally cited figure of 22 dams and 19 power plants only covers major components of the GAP project.
[9]The figure of 27 billion kilowatt hours of electricity takes no account of abstraction of water for irrigation. Once this is taken into account, the figure would be reduced.
[10]Southeastern Anatolia Regional Development Administration http://www.gap.gov.tr
[11]Southeastern Anatolia Regional Development Administration http://www.gap.gov.tr
[12]Southeastern Anatolia Regional Development Administration http://www.gap.gov.tr
[13]Unver, O., “The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP): An Overview” in Turkish Embassy, Water and Development in Southeastern Anatolia: Essays on the Ilisu Dam and GAP, London, 2000, p.17.
[14]Allan, J.A., The Middle East Water Question: Hydropolitics and the Global Economy, I.B.Taurus, London, 2000, p.73.
[15]Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, quoted in Allan, J.A., The Middle East Water Question: Hydropolitics and the Global Economy, I.B.Taurus, London, 2000, p.73.
[16]Ibid: “Water Disputes in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin”, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adg/adgb/Chap1c.HTM
[17]The Iraqi Embassy in Ankara gave a note to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 17 March 1993. Syria similarly handed a note to the Turkish Embassy in Damascus on 18th July 1993. See: “Water Disputes in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin”, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adg/adgb/Chap1c.HTM
[18]de Villiers, M., Water Wars: Is the World's Water Running Out?, Weidenfield and Nicolson, London ,1999, p.255.
[19]Letter of Iraq Foreign Minister Hosyar Zebari to the German Foreign Minister Walter Steinmeier on the 21st July 2007.
[20]Hassan Janabi: Ilisu-Summit, Berlin, 28nd May 2009
[21]Dolatyar, M. and Gray, T.S.: Water Politics in the Middle East: A context for Conflict or Co-Operation?, Macmillan Press.
[22]Information supplied by Syrian officials. The 9 billion cubic metre (Bm3) figure is for irrigation water only. The higher figure - 16.9 bm3 - also takes into account evaporation and water losses from GAP reservoirs and is thus a more realistic estimate.
[23]Information supplied by Syrian officials. In: KHRP, The Corner House: Fact Finding Mission to Syria/Iraq, 2002
[24]Information supplied by Syrian officials. In: KHRP, The Corner House: Fact Finding Mission to Syria/Iraq, 2002
[25]Kolars, J. and Mitchell, W.A., “The Euphrates River and the Southeast Anatolia Development Project”, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 1991, cited in Daoudy, M., “The Development of the Euphrates and Tigris Basins: An Assessment of Upstream Development (Turkey) on Downstream Riparians (Syria)”, Submission to the World Commission on Dams, Presented at the Africa/Middle-East Regional Consultation, December 1999, available from http://www.dams.org.
[26]Government of Iraq, Position Paper Indicating Iraq's Position on the Utilization of the Tigris River Waters, Baghdad, 2002.
[27]Marsh, N., “Water Wars”, UK Defence Forum, 1998, p.6. Online version (“Wars Downstream – Potential for conflict arising from Hydrological Time bombs”) requires subscription but is available at http://www.ukdf.org.uk/online_library_themed.htm
[28]The construction costs are estimated at 1.2 billion Euros, with an additional 800 million Euros for resettlement and “cultural heritage protection”. See, Hermes, http://www.agaportal.de/en/portal/presse_ilisu.html, 5 December 2006.
[29]

In July 2000, the Syrian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs stated in a letter to Friends of the Earth (England and Northern Ireland) that,

“The Government of the Republic of Turkey has not officially informed, consulted, or negotiated with us about the implementation of the Ilisu Dam Project on the Tigris, as stipulated by the rules of international law and the relevant agreement on the Tigris river and other agreements concluded between the two countries.”

Iraq has similarly stated that

“construction of the dam will constitute a breach of international law and it would seriously harm Iraq’s rights to the river waters.”

In August 2000, Dr. Fahmy Al-Qaysi, Director of the Legal Department of Iraq's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated,

“The State of Iraq did not receive any official notification from the State of Turkey concerning its plans to construct the Ilisu Dam, and learned about the Turkish side’s intentions through media reports.”

See: Letter to Friends of the Earth from Nasser Kaddour, Syrian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, 3 July 2000; L.N. AL-Saidi, Iraqi Interests Section, Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Letter to Friends of the Earth, 24 March1999; Dr. Fahmy Al-Qaysi, Director of Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Letter to Friends of the Earth, 18 August 2000.

[30]

The Kurdish news agency ANF (Firat News Agency) wrote:

“At the International Basin Conference in Antalya Turkey has discussed with Iraq and Syria on the Ilisu dam and Iraq and Syria are agreed that the Ilisu dam can be built. Turkish Energy minister Hilmi Güler talked secretly to Iraqi water minister Abdullatif Rashid and Syrian water minister Nader Al Buddini. The consortium will make a statement next week how the dam will be financed. It is expected that the construction of the dam will start in 3 weeks. Hilmi Guler said to the two other ministers that Turkey’s water policy on international rivers will not be changed. He doesn’t believe to ideas on water wars. DSI chief Veysel Eroglu said that they have convinced Iraq and Syria in 2 days on Ilisu project which is discussed for 2 years. On the conference (800 participants from 65 countries) it is agreed to form a 'water commission' to solve problems on water.”

The Turkish Sunday paper Zaman also carried a photograph of Iraq’s Minister of Water with a quote saying that Iraq did not have any problem with Ilisu (http://www.zaman.com.tr/webapp-tr/haber.do?haberno=518658).

[31]Press Release of BMWi (Economy Ministry), 26 March 2007, http://www.agaportal.de/pages/portal/presse/pms/2007-03-23_ilisu.htm
[32]Email from Hans-Joachim Henckel , 2 April 2007: “Konsultationen zwischen Türkei, Syrien und Irak haben am 22. März 2007 zur erklärten Zufriedenheit von Irak und Syrien stattgefunden.”
[33]Email from HE Minister of Water, Iraq to Rachel Bernu, Kurdish Human Rights Project, 27 March 2007.
[34]Hermes, “Additional information on an export credit guarantee for the hydroelectric power plant Ilisu”, http://www.agaportal.de/en/portal/presse_ilisu.html, 5 December 2006
[35]http://www.dsi.gov.tr/skatablo/Tablo1.htm
[36]Philip Williams and Associates, “A Review of the Hydrological and Geomorphic Impacts of the Proposed Ilisu Dam”, February 2006, available from WEED, http://www2.weed-online.org/uploads/PWA_Ilisu_Report.pdf.
[37]Philip Williams and Associates (PWA), Review of the ECA Final Terms of Reference for the Ilisu Dam Project”, 17.04.2007.
[38]This information is based on speaches to employees of the Ministry for Water Resources of Iraq
[39]Report on a trip to Iraq about the impacts of the Ilisu Dam on Iraq; by Ipek Tasli, Diyarbakir, August 2009
[40]The following organization working on the Ilisu project in Germany is CounterCurrent since fall 2008, http://www.gegenstroemung.org
[41]Boisson de Chazournes, L., Crawford, J. and Sands, P., “Note on Ilisu Dam project/South-eastern Anatolia Project (“GAP”)”, 2 March 2007 at Annexe 1.
[42]

The opinion states:

“This principle is now set forth in Article 16 of the ILC Articles (Aid or assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act), which provides:

“A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if:

  1. That State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and
  2. The act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.”

See also the Commentary to the ILC Article 16 on State Responsibility, available at: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf. In its Judgment of 26th February 2007 in the Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), the International Court of Justice stated that Article 16 reflected customary international law: Judgment, para. 420.

[43]Lausanne Agreement, quoted in Ministry of Water, “Republic of Iraq, The Ilisu Dam on the Tigris River in Turkey: Negative Impacts on Man and Environment in Iraq and the Legal Rules related to the Tigris and Euphrates waters ultilisation.”, Baghdad, 2006.
[44]Treaty of Friendship and Neighbourly Relations, quoted in Ministry of Water, “Republic of Iraq, The Ilisu Dam on the Tigris River in Turkey: Negative Impacts on Man and Environment in Iraq and the Legal Rules related to the Tigris and Euphrates waters ultilisation.”, Baghdad, 2006.
[45]OECD Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees, Updated Recommendation on Common Approaches on Environment and Officially Supported Export Credits, TD/ECG (2005) 3, 25 February 2005, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/33/21684464.pdf.

Gepostet vor 25th August 2009 von Ercan Ayboga