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SERIAL: (U) (b)(3): 10 USC § 424
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(b)(3): 10 USC § 424
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
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COUNTRY: (U) IRAQ (IRQ).
(b)(3): 10 USC § 424
(b)(1): Sec. 1.4(c),(b)(3): 10 USC § 424
DOI: (U) 20120730.
(b)(3): 10 USC § 424, (b)(3): 50 USC § 3024(i)
(b)(1): Sec. 1.4(c),(b)(1): Sec. 1.4(d)
14-L-/0552/DIA/288
(b)(3): 10 USC § 424
(b)(1): Sec. 1.4(c),(b)(1): Sec. 1.4(d)
THE GENERAL SITUATION:

A. INTERNALLY. EVENTS ARE TAKING A CLEAR SECTARIAN DIRECTION.
B. THE SALAFIST, THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD. AND AQI ARE THE MAJOR FORCES
DRIVING THE INSURGENCY IN SYRIA.
C. THE WEST, GULF COUNTRIES. AND TURKEY SUPPORT THE OPPOSITION; WHILE
RUSSIA, CHINA, AND IRAN SUPPORT THE REGIME.

(b)(1): Sec. 1.4(c),(b)(1): Sec. 1.4(d)
E. THE REGIME’S PRIORITY IS TO CONCENTRATE ITS PRESENCE IN AREAS
ALONG THE COAST (TARTUS. AND LATAKIA); HOWEVER, IT HAS NOT ABANDONED
HOMS BECAUSE IT CONTROLS THE MAJOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES IN SYRIA.
THE REGIME DECREASED ITS CONCENTRATION IN AREAS ADJACENT TO THE IRAQI
BORDERS (AL HASAKA AND DER Z0R).
3. (C) AL QAEDA - IRAQ (AQI):
A. AQI IS FAMILIAR WITH SYRIA. AQI TRAINED IN SYRIA AND THEN
INFILTRATED INTO IRAQ.
B. AQI SUPPORTED THE SYRIAN OPPOSITION FROM THE BEGINNING, BOTH
IDEOLOGICALLY AND THROUGH THE MEDIA. AQI DECLARED ITS OPPOSITION OF
ASSAD‘S GOVERNMENT BECAUSE IT CONSIDERED IT A SECTARIAN REGIME
TARGETTNG SUNNIS.
C. AQI CONDUCTED A NUMBER OF OPERATIONS IN SEVERAL SYRIAN CITIES
UNDER THE NAME OF JAISH AL NUSRA (VICTORIOUS ARMY), ONE OF ITS
AFFILIATES.
D. AQI, THROUGH THE SPOKESMAN OF THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ (ISI), ABU
MUHAMMAD AL ADNANI. DECLARED THE SYRIAN REGIME AS THE SPEARHEAD OF
WHAT HE IS NAMING JIBHA AL RUWAFDH (FOREFRONT OF THE SHIITES) BECAUSE
OF ITS (THE SYRIAN REGIME) DECLARATION OF WAR ON THE SUNNIS.
ADDITIONALLY, HE IS CALLING ON THE SUNNIS IN IRAQ. ESPECIALLY THE
TRIBES IN THE BORDER REGIONS (BETWEEN IRAQ AND SYRIA), TO WAGE WAR
AGAINST THE SYRIAN REGIME, REGARDING SYRIA AS AN INFIDEL REGIME FOR
ITS SUPPORT TO THE INFIDEL. PARTY HEZBOLLAH, AND OTHER REGIMES HE
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CONSIDERS DISSENTERS LIKE IRAN AND IRAQ.
E. AQI CONSIDERS THE SUNNI ISSUE IN IRAQ TO BE FATEFULLY CONNECTED TO
THE SUNNI ARABS AND MUSLIMS.
4. (C) THE BORDERS:
A. THE BORDERS BETWEEN SYRIA AND IRAQ STRETCH APPROXIMATELY 600KM
WITH COMPEX TERRAIN CONSISTING OF A VAST DESERT, MOUNTAIN RANGES
(SINJAR MOUNTAINS), JOINT RIVERS (FLOWING ON BOTH SIDES), AND
AGRICULTURAL LANDS.
B. IRAQ DIRECTLY NEIGHBORS THE SYRIAN PROVINCES OF HASAKA AND DER
ZOR, AS WELL AS (SYRIAN) CITIES ADJACENT TO THE IRAQI BORDER.
C. THE LAND ON BOTH SIDES BETWEEN IRAQ AND SYRIA IS A VAST DESERT
PUNCTUATED BY VALLEYS, AND IT LACKS TRANSPORTATION ROUTES, WITH THE
EXCEPTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL HIGHWAY AND SOME MAJOR CITIES.
5. (C) THE POPULATION LIVING ON THE BORDER:
A. THE POPULATION LIVING ON THE BORDER HAS A SOCIAL-TRIBAL STYLE,
WHICH IS BOUND BY STRONG TRIBAL AND FAMILIAL MARITAL TIES.
B. THEIR SECTARIAN AFFILIATION UNITES THE TWO SIDES WHEN EVENTS
HAPPEN IN THE REGION.
C. AQI HAD MAJOR POCKETS AND BASES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER TO
FACILITATE THE FLOW 0F MATERIEL AND RECRUITS.
D. THERE WAS A REGRESSION OF AQI IN THE WESTERN PROVINCES OF IRAQ
DURING THE YEARS OF 2009 AND 20I0; HOWEVER, AFTER THE RISE OF THE
INSURGENCY IN SYRIA, THE RELIGIOUS AND TRIBAL POWERS INTHE REGIONS
BEGAN TO SYMPATHIZE WITH THE SECTARIAN UPRISING. THIS (SYMPATHY)
APPEARED IN FRIDAY PRAYER SERMONS, WHICH CALLED FOR VOLUNTEERS TO
SUPPORT THE SUNNI'S IN SYRIA.
6. (C) THE SITUATION ON THE IRAQI AND SYRIAN BORDER:
A. THREE BORDER BDES ARE SUFFICIENT T0 CONTROL THE BORDERS DURING
PEACE TIME FOR OBSERVATION DUTIES AND TO PREVENT SMUGGLING AND
INFILTRATION.
(b)(1)Sec. 1.4(c)
C. IN PREVIOUS YEARS A MAJORITY 0F AQI FIGHTERS ENTERED IRAQ
PRIMARILY VIA THE SYRIAN BORDER.
7. (C) THE FUTURE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE CRISIS:

A. THE REGIME WILL SURVIVE AND HAVE CONTROL OVER SYRIAN TERRITORY.
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(b)(3) 10 USC § 424
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CURRENT EVENTS INTO PROXY WAR: WITH SUPPORT
FROM RUSSIA. CHINA. AND IRAN. THE REGIME IS CONTROLLING THE AREAS OF
INFLUENCE ALONG COASTAL TERRITORIES (TARTUS AND LATAKIA), AND IS
FIERCELY DEFENDING HOMS. WHICH IS CONSIDERED TIIE PRIMARY
TRANSPORTATION ROUTE IN SYRIA. ON THE OTHER HAND. OPPOSITION FORCES
ARE TRYING TO CONTROL THE EASTERN AREAS (HASAKA AND DER ZOR),
ADJACENT TO THE WESTERN IRAQI PROVINCES (MOSUL AND ANBAR). IN
ADDITION TO NEIGHBORING TURKISH BORDERS. WESTERN COUNTRIES, THE GULF
STATES AND TURKEY ARE SUPPORTING THESE EFFORTS. THIS HYPOTHESIS IS
MOST LIKELY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DATA FROM RECENT EVENTS. WHICH
WILL HELP PREPARE SAFE HAVENS UNDER INTERNATIONAL SHELTERING. SIMILAR
TO WHAT TRANSPIRED IN LIBYA WHEN BENGHAZI WAS CHOSEN AS THE COMMAND
CENTER OF THE TEMPORARY GOVERNMENT.
8. (C) THE EFFECTS ON IRAQ:
A. (b)(1)Sec. 1.4(c) SYRIAN REGIME BORDER FORCES
RETREATBD FROM THE BORDER AND THE OPPOSITION FORCES (SYRIAN FREE
ARMY) TOOK OVER THE POSTS AND RAISED THEIR FLAG. THE IRAQI BORDER
GUARD FORCES ARE FACING A BORDER WITH SYRIA THAT IS NOT GUARDED BY
OFFICIAL ELEMENTS WHICH PRESENTS A DANGEROUS AND SERIOUS THREAT.
B. THE OPPOSITION FORCES WILL TRY TO USE THE IRAQI TERRITORY AS A
SAFE HAVEN FOR ITS FORCES TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE SYMPATHY OF THE
IRAQI BORDER POPULATION. MEANWHILE TRYING TO RECRUIT FIGHTERS AND
TRAIN THEM ON THE IRAQI SIDE, IN ADDITION TO HARBORING REFUGEES
(SYRIA).
C. IF THE SITUATION UNRAVELS THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING
A DECLARED OR UNDECLARED SALAFIST PRINCIPALITY IN EASTERN SYRIA
(HASAKA AND DER ZOR). AND THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT THE SUPPORTING POWERS
TO THE OPPOSITION WANT, IN ORDER TO ISOLATE THE SYRIAN REGIME, WHICH
IS CONSIDERED THE STRATEGIC DEPTH OF THE SHIA EXPANSION (IRAQ AND
IRAN).
D. THE DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION HAS DIRE CONSEQUENCES ON THE
IRAQI SITUATION AND ARE AS FOLLOWS:
--1. THIS CREATES THE IDEAL ATMOSPHERE FOR AQI TO RETURN TO ITS OLD
POCKETS IN MOSUL AND RAMADI, AND WILL PROVIDE A RENEWED MOMENTUM
UNDER THE PRESUMPTION OF UNIFYI'NG THE JIHAD AMONG SUNNI IRAQ AND
SYRIA, AND THE REST OF THE SUNNIS IN THE ARAB WORLD AGAINST WHAT IT
CONSIDERS ONE ENEMY, THE DISSENTERS. ISI COULD ALSO DECLARE AN
ISLAMIC STATE THROUGH ITS UNION WITH OTHER TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS IN
IRAQ AND SYRIA, WHICH WILL CREATE GRAVE DANGER IN REGARDS TO UNTFYING
IRAQ AND THE PROTECTION OF ITS TERRITORY.
(b)(1)Sec. 1.4(c),(b)(1)Sec. 1.4(d)
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(b)(3) 10 USC § 424
--3. THE RENEWING FACILITATION OF TERRORIST ELEMENTS FROM ALL OVER
THE ARAB WORLD ENTERING INTO IRAQI ARENA.
(b)(1)Sec. 1.4(c),(b)(3) 10 USC § 424,(b)(3) 50 USC § 3024(i)
(b)(3) 10 USC § 424
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